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This paper examines which of three commonly-used pricing schemes – flat fee pricing, pure usage-based pricing, 
and two-part tariff pricing – is optimal for a monopolist providing information services. Our analysis suggests that 
under zero marginal costs and monitoring costs, when customers are homogeneous or when customers have 
different downward sloping demand curves, flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing achieve the same profit level, 
and dominate usage-based pricing. However, when customers are characterized by heterogeneous maximum 
consumption levels, the two-part tariff pricing is the most profitable among the three. We also examine how 
sensitive the optimal pricing scheme is to marginal costs and monitoring costs. Our analysis shows that when the 
sum of the marginal costs and the monitoring costs is below a threshold value, flat fee pricing is the optimal scheme 
regardless of how large or how small the monitoring costs are (as long as they are positive) when customers are 
homogeneous or have heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay. Positive marginal costs also do not change this 
result; but when monitoring costs are zero, the two-part tariff becomes one of the optimal pricing schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the optimal pricing scheme for a monopoly information service provider 
who provides one kind of information service. Contrary to common impression, there are actually 
quite a few monopoly information service providers that we can observe. For example, the different 
services provided by the leading social networking sites like MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter 
successfully make their businesses unique in some way and somehow secure a monopoly position in 
their own domain. The uniqueness of Second Life also makes it a monopolist in its market. These 
sites provided their services to the general public for free in the early stages of their businesses. Their 
strategic reasons for doing so were perhaps to attract traffic and adopt the advertising-supported 
business model. They may charge their users for services provided in the future once enough users 
are addicted to their services; for example, Twitter Japan was thinking about charging their customers 
at the end of 2009. 
 
There are also examples of monopoly information service providers who have charged fees for their 
services since the establishment of their businesses. In many regions, there is just one cable TV 
provider that has taken advantage of its monopoly power. Both the Consumer Federation of America 
and Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, have criticized such 
companies for their poor services and skyrocketing cable rates in recent years. Gogo Inflight Internet 
has successfully created a monopoly environment on airplanes where its services are offered, since 
customers do not have any other Internet connection choice while they are in the air. Similarly, the 
Internet connection services provided on many cruise ships are also examples of monopoly 
information services providers who charge fees. 
 
One of the most salient and unique characteristics of information services is that with enough capacity, 
the marginal cost of providing the services is negligible (near zero or zero). This makes flat fee pricing 
attractive and viable, as has been argued by many researchers (e.g., Oi, 1971; Fishburn et al., 1997). 
While traditional nonlinear pricing theory (Maskin and Riley, 1984; Wilson, 1993; Armstrong, 1996) 
has suggested that the optimal pricing strategy for a monopolist is strictly based on usage, and many 
researchers strongly advocate the optimality of two-part tariff pricing (Oi, 1971; Schmalensee, 1981; 
Calem and Spulber, 1984; Hayes, 1987; Stole, 1995; Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and Stole, 
2002), the results to date have been based on the assumption that there is a relatively high marginal 
cost of production. This is actually why almost all, if not all, utilities services firms adopt usage-based 
pricing (with or without a subscription fee). For some of the exceptions we have observed, there are 
usually other reasons why flat fee pricing has been adopted. For example, there may be no 
monitoring facility available, or the monitoring facilities may be too expensive to install and use for 
individual users. 
 
While some argue that negligible marginal production cost makes flat fee pricing more profitable for 
information services (Fishburn et al., 1997), some researchers believe that diminished monitoring or 
distribution costs make usage-based pricing a relatively more attractive option for information 
services (Choi et al., 1997; Metcalfe, 1997). There is so far no clear guidance about when information 
service providers should adopt flat fee pricing and when pure usage-based pricing (without a 
subscription fee) or even a two-part tariff (usage-based pricing plus a subscription fee) is more 
profitable. Many information service providers have struggled to find the best ways to price their 
services and bill their customers, and this is reflected in the wide variety of pricing schemes offered 
by different information service providers.   
 
Specifically, we are interested in knowing which among the three most popular pricing schemes used 
in practice – flat fee pricing, usage-based pricing, and two-part tariff pricing – is the best for a 
monopolist providing information services. Overall, our analysis suggests that under conditions of 
zero marginal and monitoring costs, when customers are homogeneous or when customers have 
heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay (which corresponds to different downward sloping 
demand curves), flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing always achieve the same profit level, and 
are strictly better than the usage-based pricing. However, when customers are characterized by 
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three. We also examine how sensitive the optimal pricing scheme is to marginal costs and monitoring 
costs when customers are homogeneous or when customers have heterogeneous marginal 
willingness to pay. Our analysis shows that when the sum of the marginal cost and the monitoring 
cost is below a certain value, flat fee pricing is the optimal scheme regardless of how large or how 
small monitoring cost is (as long as it is positive) when customers are homogeneous or have 
heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay. Even increasing marginal cost does not change this result. 
Nevertheless, when monitoring cost is zero, the two-part tariff becomes one of the optimal pricing 
schemes.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the information service pricing literature. In 
Section 3, we provide the general model for the market for information services. Section 4 reports on 
the analysis of different pricing schemes and when they are the best choice for the information 
service provider. Section 5 outlines some model extensions.  We provide concluding remarks and a 
discussion of our results in Section 6. 
2. Literature Review 
While there has been increasing interest in how to price information goods, like software, digital 
songs, or movies (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; Chuang and Sirbu, 1999; Varian, 2000), much of 
the work either does not address information services, or is only indirectly applicable to such cases. 
For example, the advantages of pure bundling documented in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and 
customized bundling documented in Wu et al. (2008) result from reduction in the variance of 
customers’ valuations for a bundle of different information goods. These modeling techniques cannot 
be applied to information services, since each unit of information services is essentially identical1
 
 and, 
therefore, we cannot expect variance to be reduced through aggregation of identical units.  In this 
paper, we use a framework in which both buyers and sellers of information services optimize value in 
order to determine which pricing scheme works best under different conditions. 
Recent works that are related to information service pricing include Fishburn et al. (1997), Essegaier 
et al. (2002), and Sundararajan (2004). Our paper is complementary to these papers. Sundararajan 
(2004) considers fixed-fee and nonlinear usage-based pricing schemes. However, the focus of his 
study is different from ours in this paper. He shows that in the presence of contract administration 
costs, such as monitoring costs for usage-based pricing, a monopolist can improve its profits by 
offering fixed-fee pricing in addition to a usage-based contract. However, while this study has 
suggested that a firm could improve its profits by adopting a mix of pricing schemes, the results are 
based on a utility function that has to satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1993), which allows a firm to possibly segment customers profitably through their self-
selection. When this property does not hold, it is not clear whether adopting multiple schemes will still 
improve profit. 
 
In addition, Sundararajan (2004) does not offer any direct guidance about which pricing scheme is 
most profitable when the firm can only opt for one pricing scheme, the major focus of our paper. 
There are several situations where firms may prefer to adopt only one pricing scheme. For example, 
when a new information service is being introduced in the market, the firm may prefer to adopt only 
one pricing scheme to keep the marketing simple; easier administration and management may also 
make the firm prefer one pricing scheme only (Curle, 1998; Wilson, 1993). 
 
Moreover, it is actually common in the literature to assume the monopolist will choose a single pricing 
scheme, like in Essegaier et al. (2002), Masuda and Whang (2006), and Fishburn et al. (1997). It is 
also a common practice in real life. We observe only a few instances of sophisticated nonlinear 
pricing in practice and find mostly very simple pricing schemes in wide use. For example, Verizon has 
chosen just the flat fee pricing scheme for its DSL high-speed Internet service and E*TRADE charges 
commissions based solely on the number of trades placed by the customers, which is an example of 
pure usage-based pricing. Another simple pricing scheme is that adopted by SingTel, which charges 
users of its telephone line services in Singapore a quarterly subscription fee, plus unit call charges. 
This is a two-part tariff scheme. 
                                                     
1 Thus, they will have perfect correlation across units in customers’ valuations. 
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Fishburn et al. (1997) compare the flat fee and the usage-based pricing and show that a flat fee is 
better than a metered rate for a monopolist offering information services on the Internet. However, 
they simplify the problem with some very restrictive assumptions. For example, they assume that 
consumers choose the quantity of service to buy and stick to it before examining the available prices. 
It is not clear whether their results could be generalized to more general demand functions, for 
example, a downward sloping demand function. 
 
We differ from Sundararajan (2004) and Fishburn et al. (1997) in considering two-part tariff pricing, 
which is popular both in theory and in practice. Essegaier et al. (2002) also consider the two-part tariff 
pricing together with flat fee and usage-based pricing. However, as in Fishburn et al. (1997), they 
assume that consumer usage is inelastic to price changes. Moreover, they assume that both heavy 
and light users have the same total reservation price for the service. This may be a questionable 
assumption, as users usually have quite different and diminishing marginal utility for each unit of 
service they consume.2
 
 It is also questionable to assume that marginal cost is zero when the service 
provider has a capacity constraint. (Another problem with capacity constraint is the possible queuing 
problems, which is not discussed in their paper.) 
Table 1 below summarizes these recent studies.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Some Recent Research Including This Paper 
 Major Assumptions Major Finding 
Fishburn et al. 
(1997) 
The firm prefers to adopt only one pricing 
scheme. 
Consider flat fee and usage-based pricing. 
Consumers choose the quantity of service to 
buy and stick to it before examining the 
available prices. 
Flat fee pricing is better than 
a metered rate for a 
monopolist. 
Essegaier et al. 
(2002) 
The firm prefers to adopt only one pricing 
scheme. 
Consider two-part tariff pricing together with flat 
fee and usage-based pricing. 
Consumer usage is inelastic to price change. 
Both heavy and light users have the same total 
reservation price for the service. 
Marginal cost is zero when there is capacity 
constraint. 
Flat fee pricing is a 
sustainable pricing structure 




The firm is willing to adopt a mix of pricing 
schemes. 
Consider flat fee and nonlinear usage-based 
pricing. 
Employs a utility function that satisfies the 
Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property. 
A firm can improve its profits 
by adopting a mix of pricing 
schemes. 
This paper The firm prefers to adopt only one pricing 
scheme. 
Two-part tariff pricing, flat fee pricing and usage-
based pricing. 
Employs a downward sloping demand function. 
Either flat fee pricing or the 
two-part tariff is the optimal 
pricing scheme, depending 
on different conditions. 
3. Market Model for Information Services 
In this paper, we consider the three most commonly-used pricing schemes: pure flat fee pricing, pure 
usage-based pricing, and two-part tariff pricing. The monopoly information service provider chooses 
which pricing scheme to adopt and the prices to offer. Consumers then make decisions about 
                                                     
2 Although they extend their model by using the same unit reservation price for the two consumer segments, their 
assumption still fails to reflect the fact that users usually have quite different and diminishing marginal utility for each 
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whether to join the plan, and how much to consume given the pricing scheme and prices set by the 
monopoly information service provider.  
 
Since some information services usually experience some peak hours and some non-peak hours, we 
assume that consumers may have different utility functions during these times. As a result, 
information service providers may charge different prices for the two time segments when using 
usage-based pricing. For example, many telephone service providers like SingTel in Singapore still 
charge different unit prices for peak and non-peak hours. Note this assumption does not limit but 
rather enriches our model. It is because if consumers actually have the same utility functions in peak 
hours and non-peak hours, our model can accommodate these different settings and the provider can 
always charge the same price for the two time segments and treat them equally, if it wishes to. 
 
In addition, because consumers have limited time, energy, attention, and diminishing marginal utility, 
we assume that they face certain upper bounds in consuming the services. This is a reasonable 
assumption, as almost all, if not all, information services have this property, and no single consumer 
can continue to consume one information service without any limit. For example, consumers cannot 
consume a time-based information service like voice communication for more than 24 hours a day. 
Given the limited transmission rate of the device used, the traffic volume in each period is also 
naturally bounded for any data transmission service. The number of trades through E*TRADE and 
Short Messaging Services (SMS) / Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) have the same property as 
the number of trades or uses in each period being bounded above at least by the total time available, 
given a positive time requirement to complete each trade or use.      
3.1. The Consumer’s Optimization Problem 
Given the pricing scheme (flat fee, usage-based, or two-part tariff) and price(s) set by the information 
service provider, consumer i will decide whether or not she wants to join the service program (i.e., to 
buy the information service) and what her consumption level of the service will be in both peak hours 
and non-peak hours to maximize her total net utility.  
 
Given Parameters: 
: the subscription fee for the consumer to join the program
: the unit price of the service set by the provider in peak hours










: the utility function of consumer  at the consumption level of  in peak hours and 
                   in non-peak hours













: consumer 's consumption level of the service in peak hours
: consumer 's consumption level of the service in non-peak hours






Z i ogram and 0 otherwise
 
 
Consumer’s Optimization Problem: 
, ,
Max
i i iX Y Z
( ),i i i X i Y i iU X Y P X P Y PZ− − −         (1) 
s.t.  
iX ≤ iX iZ                                                 (2) 
iY ≤ iY iZ                                                    (3) 
( ), 0i i i X i Y i iU X Y P X P Y PZ− − − ≥             (4)     (The Individual Rationality constraints) 
0 or 1iZ =                                                (5)    
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The objective function (1) is to maximize the consumer surplus given the price(s) set up by the 
information service provider. Similar to the concept of maximizing net profit (revenue minus cost) for 
the firms, the assumption of maximizing consumer surplus (utility minus cost) for consumers is a 
standard set-up in consumer decision modeling and is widely adopted in the literature (e.g., 
Armstrong, 1996; Fishburn et al., 1997; Sundararajan, 2004; Masuda and Whang, 2006; Wu and 
Chen, 2008; Wu et al., 2008). In our model, we do not consider the initial cost for the consumer to join 
the program, such as the purchase of 3G mobile devices in the 3G wireless service scenarios, for two 
reasons. First, when we consider the long-term relationship between the supplier and consumers, this 
kind of one-time expense may not be as important as the monthly usage fee and the subscription fee. 
Further, this one-time fee does not affect the optimization problem, and it can be absorbed by 
( ),i i iU X Y . 
 
Note also that there is no parameter in this model that indicates the pricing scheme adopted by the 
information service provider. Rather than using an additional parameter to indicate the pricing 
mechanism, the pricing scheme chosen actually is reflected by the values of XP , YP , and P . For 
example, when XP  and YP  are both zero and P  is positive, it is pure flat fee pricing; when XP  and 
YP  are positive and P  is zero, we have pure usage-based pricing; and when XP , YP , and P  are all 
positive, two-part tariff pricing is being represented. Additionally, in this paper, we consider the 
simplest and most commonly adopted usage-based and two-part tariff pricing in which the unit price 
of the service is constant and does not change with the consumer’s consumption level. For example, 
almost all, if not all, residential long distance voice communication services (with or without a monthly 
fee) and wireless data transmission services have a constant unit price. 
 
Given XP , YP , and P , consumer i will decide if she wants to join the program. If she decides not to 
join by choosing iZ = 0, constraints (2) and (3) will force her consumption levels iX  and iY  to be 
zero, and her total utility and cost are both zero. On the other hand, if she decides to join the program 
and chooses iZ = 1, she then has to decide her optimal consumption levels iX  and iY , which cannot 
exceed her upper bounds iX  and iY , as enforced by constraints (2) and (3). Also note that the 
consumption levels iX  and iY  here could be the consumption time, such as in voice communication 
services, or the traffic volume in data transmission services, or the number of trades through online 
discount brokers, or the number of messages sent in SMS/MMS services.  
 
3.2. The Supplier’s Optimization Problem 
Given the optimization problem faced by the consumers, the information service provider will decide 
what pricing scheme to adopt to maximize its total profit. We assume that marginal production cost for 
providing one more unit of the service to the customer, and monitoring cost for one unit of the service 
in usage-based pricing3
 
 are both negligible or zero. We will discuss this assumption in Section 5. 
Given Parameters: 
* ( , , ) : consumer 's consumption level of the service in peak hours
* ( , , ) : consumer 's consumption level of the service in non-peak hours
* ( , , ) : consumer 's decision variable
i i X Y
i i X Y
i i X Y
X X P P P i
Y Y P P P i






, : the utility function of consumer  at the consumption level of  in peak hours and 
                   in non-peak hours
: consumer 's maximum consumption level of t
i i i i
i
i
U X Y i X
Y
X i he service in peak hours
: consumer 's maximum consumption level of the service in non-peak hoursiY i
 
Decision Variables: 
                                                     
3 Since there is no need to monitor the customer usage level in flat fee pricing, we assume that flat fee pricing does 
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: the subscription fee for the consumer to join the program
: the unit price of the service set by the provider in peak hours







The Supplier’s Optimization Problem: 
, ,
Max
X YP P P
( )* * *X i Y i i
i
P X P Y PZ+ +∑               (6) 
where ( *, *, *)i i iX Y Z  = argmax ( ),i i i X i Y i iU X Y P X P Y PZ− − −                                       
s.t.  
iX ≤ iX iZ  
iY ≤ iY iZ  
( ), 0i i i X i Y i iU X Y P X P Y PZ− − − ≥  
0 or 1iZ =                                                                                                     
 
The objective function (6) is to maximize the total profit given the optimization problems faced by the 
consumers. Note that we do not consider the initial fixed cost of providing the service to each 
consumer, as it is not as important if we consider the long-term relationship between the supplier and 
consumers. And this is perhaps why we see many wireless service providers offering free phones to 
attract new long-term customers. 
 
In addition, like in Sundararajan (2004) and Fishburn et al. (1997), we assume the service provider 
has enough capacity, so the marginal cost of providing the service is zero. Note that given any 
capacity, we can assume the marginal cost within capacity is zero. A firm only faces large “marginal 
cost” when it needs to increase capacity, but this is actually another investment decision made by the 
firm, rather than the marginal cost of the service, because with new larger capacity, marginal cost 
goes to zero again. In fact, in real life, as the costs of IT and communication equipment keep 
dropping every year, it is relatively easy and cheap for the information service providers to increase 
their capacity if they see the need. For example, personal communication services (PCS) carriers 
usually have negligible marginal cost, as they have large unused networks (PCS Week 1997). As a 
result, we think it is a reasonable assumption that the service provider can always maintain enough 
capacity and keep the marginal cost at zero. Based on this model, we can find the most profitable 
pricing scheme and price(s) to charge the consumers given the consumers the provider faces. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. The Base Case: Homogeneous Consumers 
As the first case, we consider homogeneous consumers in the market with the same utility function 
and the same upper bounds X  and Y on the consumption level in peak hours and non-peak hours, 
respectively. For analytical convenience, we adopt the frequently used Cobb-Douglas type of utility 
function (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998), ( ), log logU X Y a X b Y= + , with one minor modification:4
( ) ( ) ( ), log 1 log 1U X Y a X b Y= + + +
 
                             (7) 
 
With this modification, when the consumption level is zero, consumers will get zero utility rather than 
negative infinity as utility. Note that this utility function is increasing and strictly concave in 
consumption level and that X  and Y  are substitutes in that one could substitute one for the other to 
get the same utility. We adopt this specific utility function for two reasons: It not only greatly simplifies 
our derivations but also allow us to explore how the homogeneity (in this subsection) and 
heterogeneity (in Subsection 4.2.) of consumer utility functions (with diminishing marginal utility 
                                                     
4 Log denotes natural log here. 
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property) affect a firm’s choice of pricing structure. Using the general form of utility function 
( ),i i iU X Y  would make our analysis much less tractable and less transparent without any apparent 
promise for new insights. Note also that this model could accommodate the case when consumers 
have the same utility for the two time segments. We can do this by setting a equal to b, so the service 
provider treats the two time segments as the same. 
 
With this specific utility function, each consumer will then face the following optimization problem: 
 




( )log 1 log( 1) X Ya X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − −           (8) 
s.t.  
X ≤ X Z                                                                          (9) 
Y ≤ Y Z                                                                           (10) 
( )log 1 log( 1) 0X Ya X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − − ≥       (11)  
0 or 1Z =                  (12) 
 
In the consumer’s optimization problem, the information service provider tries to solve the following 
optimization problem: 
 
The Supplier’s Optimization Problem: 
, ,
Max
X YP P P
( )* * *X Y
i
P X P Y PZ+ +∑                                       (13) 
where ( *, *, *)X Y Z  = argmax ( )log 1 log( 1) X Ya X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − −  
s.t.  
X ≤ X Z                                                                                                             
Y ≤ Y Z  
( )log 1 log( 1) 0X Ya X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − − ≥  
0 or 1Z =                                                                                               
 
To solve the supplier’s optimization problem, we make the following observations: First, since all 
consumers are assumed to be homogeneous, all consumers will make the same “join” or “not join” 
decision, and the service provider either will serve all of them or will serve none of them. In order to 
maximize profit, the service provider will make sure that all consumers want to join the program. 
Second, since the major pricing mechanisms we are studying in this paper are pure flat fee, pure 
usage-based, and two-part tariff pricing, we can do the analysis separately and see what is the best 
profit the service provider can get by each pricing plan. 
 
Lemma 1: if the service provider uses the pure flat fee, the price charged will be a log( X +1) + b log(
Y +1) (for the peak hour problem, it is the whole area below curve D in Figure 1), and the maximum 
profit achievable will be 
i
∑ [a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1)]. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 












, with maximum profit: 
i
∑ (a - 1
a
X +




) =  
i
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
  












. The maximum subscription fee P the supplier can charge is the 
difference between the maximum utility the consumers can get, a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1), and the 








) (for the peak hour problem, it is the triangular area 
below curve D and above 
1
a
X +  
in Figure 1). Therefore, the maximum profit achievable by the 
service provider is 
i
∑ [a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1)] 




Figure 1:  Homogeneous Consumers 
 
From Lemmas 1 to 3, note that since log( X +1) > (1 - 1
1X +
)  and log(Y +1)> (1 - 
1
1Y +
) for all 
, 0X Y > ,  we have a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1)> [a(1 - 1
1X +
)  + b(1 - 
1
1Y +
)]. That is, the pure flat 
fee pricing and the two-part tariff pricing yield the same profit and are strictly better than the pure 
usage-based pricing from the service provider’s profit maximization point of view. 
 
This result is consistent with the argument that since the marginal cost is negligible for information 
services, flat fee pricing is more viable and attractive. In fact, because serving one more unit of the 
services will not increase costs for the information service provider, the information service provider 
has the incentive to attract as many customers as possible to the plan and provide all-you-can-
consume services while using the flat fee pricing to extract all of the consumer surplus. Traditional 
nonlinear pricing theory has advocated the optimality of two-part tariffs. It has also suggested that the 
monopolist should set the unit usage price at the marginal cost and use the subscription fee to extract 
the remaining consumer surplus. This pricing scheme remains the most appropriate when the 
marginal cost and the monitoring cost are both negligible. From our analysis, we can clearly see that 
the information service provider should still try to match the unit usage price to the marginal cost by 
 
 
Wu & Banker/Best Pricing Strategy 
348 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 11 Issue 6 pp. 339-366 June 2010 
lowering the unit usage price. However, while the marginal cost is zero, and the consumption levels 
for the information services are naturally bounded, the information service provider will realize that 
there is no need to lower the unit usage price further and will stop at the point when the consumers’ 
consumption levels will not increase further because of the unit usage price drop. In spite of this, the 
subscription fee can still successfully extract the remaining consumer surplus and achieve the same 
profit level for the information service provider as in the case when the information service provider 
adopts the flat fee pricing mechanism. However, because the pure usage-based pricing lacks this 
flexibility, it cannot extract the remaining consumer surplus while the unit usage price is reduced to 
the same level as in the case of the two-part tariff. 
4.2. Heterogeneous Customers 
In the previous analysis, we showed that flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing are more profitable 
than pure usage-based pricing. However, the assumption of homogeneous consumers may be 
somewhat restrictive, so we relax this assumption by considering different types of heterogeneous 
customers. Following Jain et al. (1999), we examine two sets of customer segmentation: “high-end” 
and “low-end” in terms of willingness-to-pay (Subsection 4.2.1.), and “heavy” and “light” in terms of 
level of usage (Subsection 4.2.2.). We further assume that it is in the firm’s interest to serve both 
segments in each case; otherwise, the problem is reduced to that considered in Subsection 4.1. We 
also assume that the information service provider cannot discriminate between these two consumer 
segments. This assumption is reasonable since it is usually hard for the service provider to tell what 
segment the consumers belong to. Note that if the information service provider can discriminate 
between these two types of consumers, the problem is similar to that in Subsection 4.1., and the 
information service provider can simply offer different flat fee pricing or two-part tariff pricing to 
different consumer segments.  
4.2.1. Heterogeneous customers: the high-end customers and the low-end customers 
We suppose there are m high-end consumers (i=1) and n low-end consumers (i=2). To study how 
heterogeneous willingness to pay affects a firm’s pricing scheme, we assume each consumer in both 
segments has the same upper bounds X  and Y  in peak hours and non-peak hours, and 1 2a a> , 
1 2b b> .  
 
Consumer’s Optimization Problem: 
, ,
Max
i i iX Y Z
( )log 1 log( 1)i i i i X i Y i ia X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − −               (14) 
s.t.  
iX ≤ X iZ                                                                                  (15)                              
iY ≤ Y iZ                               (16) 
( )log 1 log( 1) 0i i i i X i Y i ia X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − − ≥                  (17)                                                                                                    
0 or 1iZ =                       (18) 
 
The Supplier’s Optimization Problem: 
, ,
Max
X YP P P
( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2* * * * * *X Y X Ym P X P Y PZ n P X P Y PZ+ + + + +     (19) 
where ( *, *, *)i i iX Y Z  = argmax  ( )log 1 log( 1)i i i i X i Y i ia X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − −                    
s.t.  
iX ≤ X iZ  
iY ≤ Y iZ  
( )log 1 log( 1) 0i i i i X i Y i ia X b Y P X P Y PZ+ + + − − − ≥  
0 or 1iZ =                                                   
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Lemma 4: If the service provider uses the pure flat fee, the price charged will be 
( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1a X b Y+ + +  (for the peak hour problem, it is the whole area below curve 2D  in 
Figure 2), and the maximum profit achievable will be ( ) ( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1m n a X b Y + + + +  .  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
                                                                                                              







 the optimal 
price in the peak hours is 
 







. The maximum profit is 1 1 1 12 2( ) ( )1 1 1 1
a X b Y a bm n a b
X Y X Y
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1 1





Proof: See the Appendix. 
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in Figure 2) with the 
maximum profit achievable: 2 2( )[ log( 1) log( 1)]m n a X b Y+ + + + .                         




Figure 2:  Heterogeneous Willingness-to-pay Customers 
 
                                                     
5 If we normalize X  to be 1, this condition means m > n. 
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From Lemmas 4, 5, and 6, we know the maximum profits achievable when the service provider 
adopts each of the pricing mechanisms, pure flat fee pricing, pure usage-based pricing, and two-part 
tariff pricing. It is not hard to show that for all X ≥  0 and Y ≥  0, m[a2 log( X +1) + b2 log(Y +1)] + 

















pure flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing are strictly preferred to pure usage-based pricing from 
the service provider’s profit maximization point of view. 
                                                                                                                                          
Proposition 1 (Pricing Scheme Selection When Customers Have Heterogeneous 
Willingness to Pay – Two Types) When there are two types of consumers characterized by 
heterogeneous willingness to pay in the market, flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing yield the 
same profit, which is higher than pure usage-based pricing. 
 
Note that the conclusion from this subsection is exactly the same as that derived in Subsection 4.1., 
that is, the flat fee pricing and the two-part tariff always yield the same profit, and dominate usage-
based pricing. The intuition behind this is that if the information service providers have sufficient 
capacity and negligible marginal and monitoring costs, they have the incentive to set the prices at 
levels that would encourage the customers to consume as much as they want, as in the case when 
all consumers are homogeneous. While the supplier can easily use flat fee pricing to extract all 
consumer surplus when all consumers are homogeneous, it can only successfully extract the 
consumer surplus of the low-end consumers and leave a large surplus to its high-end consumers if it 
is in the firm’s interest to serve both segments. The same is true for the two-part tariff. No matter what 
unit usage price the information service provider sets for the service, the best subscription fee it can 
charge the consumers is the consumer surplus of the low-end consumers. Any subscription fee more 
than this will cause the information service provider to lose all of the low-end consumers. As a result, 
the high-end consumers will still enjoy a large surplus. 
 
Another interesting thing from the analysis that is different from the case when all consumers are 
homogeneous is that if we compare the cases of pure usage-based pricing and two-part tariff pricing, 
we can clearly see that with pure usage-based pricing, sometimes it is in the firm’s interest to set the 
unit usage prices at a higher level (depending on the relative size of the market segments) so that 
only the high-end consumers will fully utilize the service to their maximum levels and the low-end 
consumers will consume less. When this is the case, the revenue collected from the service usage is 
less, since the unit usage price is set at a lower level for the two-part tariff, but because the 
information service provider can charge more subscription fees from both markets segments, this 
revenue loss can be well compensated. Note also that while these results are established under one 
or two segments of customers, they could be generalized to a continuous type of customers. 
 
Proposition 2 (Pricing Scheme Selection When Customers Have Heterogeneous 
Willingness to Pay – Multiple Types) When consumers are characterized by heterogeneous 
willingness to pay in the market, flat fee pricing and two-part tariff pricing yield the same profit, 
which is higher than pure usage-based pricing. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
4.2.2. Heterogeneous customers: the high-demand customers and the low-demand 
customers 
In this subsection, we consider how the heterogeneous maximum consumption level might affect a 
firm’s pricing choice. Again, we assume two types of customers, the high-demand customers (type 1) 
with maximum consumption level at 1X and 1Y  and the low-demand customers (type 2) with 
maximum consumption level at 2X and 2Y , where 1 2X X>  and 1 2Y Y> . As before, there are m 
type 1 customers and n type 2 customers with 1 2a a a= = and 1 2b b b= = .   
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Lemma 7: If the service provider uses the pure flat fee, the price charged will be
 ( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1P a X b Y= + + +  (for the peak hour problem, it is the area below curve D and left of 
2X in Figure 3), and the maximum profit achievable will be ( ) ( )2 2( )[ log 1 log 1 ]m n a X b Y+ + + + .  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
                                                                                                                 
Lemma 8: If the service provider uses pure usage-based pricing, when 𝑛𝑋2 ≥ 𝑚, the optimal price in 
the peak hours is 𝑃𝑋 =
𝑎
𝑋2+1












 (see Figure 3) and 𝑃𝑌 =
𝑏
𝑌1+1









Proof: See the Appendix. 
 














respectively, and the subscription fee: 







+ +  
(for the peak hour problem, it is the area 
below curve D, above 𝑎
𝑋1+1
, and left of 2X in Figure 3). Therefore, the maximum profit achievable by 
the service provider is 1 2 1 2 2 2
1 1
( ) ( )( log( 1) log( 1))
1 1
X X Y Ym a b m n a X b Y
X Y
− −
+ + + + + +
+ +
, which is 
greater than what can be achieved with either flat fee pricing or usage-based pricing.                         




Figure 3:  Heterogeneous Maximum-consumption-level Customers 
 
Proposition 3 (Pricing Scheme Selection When Customers Have Heterogeneous Maximum 
Consumption Levels) When there are two types of consumers characterized by heterogeneous 
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While Subsection 4.1. and Proposition 1 show that when all consumers are homogeneous or when 
the consumers are characterized by heterogeneous willingness to pay, flat fee pricing and two-part 
tariff pricing are both optimal pricing schemes, Proposition 3 shows that when consumers are 
characterized by heterogeneous maximum consumption levels, the two-part tariff is the only optimal 
pricing scheme. This result is interesting. It identifies the condition under which a two-part tariff is the 
only optimal pricing scheme even when the marginal cost is negligible. This is an extension to the 
traditional nonlinear pricing literature as the optimality of the two-part tariff in the traditional nonlinear 
pricing literature is based on the assumption of relatively large marginal cost. The intuition behind 
Proposition 3 is that when the heterogeneity is characterized by the difference in maximum 
consumption levels, the two-part tariff is optimal due to the additional flexibility to address the 
consumption differences between the consumer groups. In addition to the consumer surplus of the 
low-demand consumers that can be captured by pure flat fee pricing, the two-part tariff can do better 
by capturing some more surplus from the high-demand consumers when the consumers are 
characterized by heterogeneous maximum consumption levels, while this is not true when the 
consumers are characterized by heterogeneous willingness to pay. 
 
Note also that similar to the case when the consumers are characterized by heterogeneous 
willingness to pay, with the pure usage-based pricing, the firm may set the unit usage prices at a 
higher level (also depending on the relative size of the market segments). However, now only the low-
demand consumers will fully utilize the service to their maximum levels, while the high-demand 
consumers will consume less than their maximum consumption levels, contrary to the case when the 
consumers are characterized by heterogeneous willingness to pay. Again, while the revenue collected 
from the service usage is less for the two-part tariff in this case, this revenue loss can be 
compensated for by the flexibility of subscription fees. In the absence of this flexibility, pure flat fee 
pricing is less desirable than two-part tariff pricing, while pure usage-based pricing is the least 
attractive for the information service provider to adopt. 
5. Model Extension—Marginal Cost and Monitoring Cost 
In the previous analyses, we assume that the marginal cost (denoted by c) and the monitoring cost 
(denoted by t) are both zero. However, while there is no doubt that the marginal cost and the 
monitoring cost are both dramatically lowered by advanced information technologies, they may still 
remain positive in some cases. In this section, we relax this assumption and examine how positive 
(but small) marginal cost and monitoring cost affect the optimal pricing scheme. Generally speaking, 
positive marginal cost is expected to make flat fee pricing less attractive and favor two-part tariff 
pricing and usage-based pricing, while positive monitoring cost tends to make two-part tariff pricing or 
usage-based pricing less desirable than flat fee pricing since there is no need to incur monitoring 
expenses in flat fee pricing. The optimal pricing scheme, thus, depends on the tradeoff between these 
two costs. However, our analysis shows that in the cases where customers are homogeneous or are 
characterized by heterogeneous willingness to pay, the optimal scheme is not sensitive to these two 
costs when c + t is below a certain threshold value. Holding c constant, reducing monitoring cost t 
does not make two-part tariff pricing or usage-based pricing a better choice than flat fee pricing; on 
the other hand, holding t constant, increasing marginal cost c does not make flat fee pricing less 
attractive than two-part tariff or usage-based pricing, as long as c + t is below a certain value.  
 
As in the previous sections, we analyze the peak hour problem first. We note that the joint problem of 
peak and non-peak hours can be solved in the same manner.  
 
With positive marginal cost and monitoring cost, the profit from each customer (denoted by π ) for the 
firm under each pricing scheme is given by: 
 
Under flat fee pricing: P cXπ = − , and to maximize the profit, P  will be set at log( 1)a X + , with 
profit achievable: log( 1)a X cX+ − . 
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= −  from the first order condition in the customer’s optimization 
problem. The profit-maximizing per-use price can be shown to be: * max{ , ( )}
1X










, and the maximum profit can be shown to be 
( * ) ( *) ( *) * ( *) ( )X X X X XP c t X P X P P X P c t− − = ⋅ − ⋅ + . 
Under two-part tariff pricing: ( ) ( )X XP c t X P Pπ = − − + , again ( )XX P  is the demand function 




= −  from the first order condition in the customer’s optimization 





, we can derive the profit-maximizing per-use 
price, * max{ , ( )}
1X




, and P, the subscription fee, will be set at 
log( ( *) 1) ( *) *X X Xa X P X P P+ − ⋅ , to fully extract consumer surplus. The maximum profit is, thus, 
equal to log( ( *) 1) ( *) ( )X Xa X P X P c t+ − ⋅ + . 
 
While traditional nonlinear pricing theory has suggested that the optimal pricing strategy for a 
monopolist is strictly based on usage, and many researchers strongly advocate the optimality of two-
part tariff pricing when there is a relatively high marginal cost of production, in this paper we are most 
interested in the cases when both the marginal cost and the monitoring cost are dramatically lowered 
with the advance of information technology. This maps to the case when 𝑎
𝑋+1
≥ �𝑎(𝑐 + 𝑡)  (or 
𝑎
�𝑋+1�
2 ≥ (𝑐 + 𝑡)), when both the marginal cost and the monitoring cost are at a low level. In fact, 
when 𝑎
𝑋+1
≥ �𝑎(𝑐 + 𝑡) (or 𝑎
�𝑋+1�
2 ≥ (𝑐 + 𝑡)), 𝑃𝑋∗ =
𝑎
𝑋+1
. The maximum profit achievable with flat fee 
pricing is equal to log( 1)a X cX+ − ; the maximum profit achievable with usage-based pricing is 
equal to (𝑃𝑋∗ − 𝑐 − 𝑡)𝑋(𝑃𝑋∗) = �
𝑎
𝑋+1
− 𝑐 − 𝑡�𝑋 = 𝑎𝑋
𝑋+1
− 𝑐𝑋 − 𝑡𝑋 ; while the maximum profit 
achievable with two-part tariff pricing is equal to 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑋(𝑃𝑋∗) + 1) − 𝑋(𝑃𝑋∗)(𝑐 + 𝑡) = 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑋 + 1� −
𝑋(𝑐 + 𝑡) = 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑋 + 1� − 𝑐𝑋 − 𝑡𝑋.  Note that because log( X +1) > (1 - 1
1X +
) and we have 
assumed 𝑎
�𝑋+1�
2 ≥ (𝑐 + 𝑡) , it is not hard to see that 𝑎 log�𝑋 + 1� − 𝑐𝑋 ≥ 𝑎 log�𝑋 + 1� − 𝑐𝑋 −
𝑡𝑋 > 𝑎𝑋
𝑋+1
− 𝑐𝑋 − 𝑡𝑋 > 𝑎𝑋
�𝑋+1�
2 − 𝑐𝑋 − 𝑡𝑋 ≥ 0. 
 
From our analysis above, we can clearly see that when (𝑐 + 𝑡) ≤ 𝑎
�𝑋+1�
2, flat fee pricing always 
dominates two-part tariff pricing and usage-based pricing, no matter how large or how small the 
monitoring cost is (as long as it is positive).  When the monitoring cost, t, goes down to zero, two-part 
tariff pricing generates the same profit as flat fee pricing. Also, as long as (𝑐 + 𝑡) ≤ 𝑎
�𝑋+1�
2 and the 
monitoring cost t is positive, increasing marginal cost c does not make either usage-based pricing or 
two-part tariff pricing a better choice than flat fee pricing. Similarly, we can show that for the non-peak 
hours, when (𝑐 + 𝑡) ≤ 𝑏
�𝑌+1�
2, flat fee pricing always dominates two-part tariff pricing and usage-
based pricing no matter how large or how small the monitoring cost is (as long as it is positive), and 
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Proposition 4 (Pricing Scheme Selection When the Total of Marginal and Monitoring Costs 
Are Low) In the cases where customers are homogeneous or are characterized by 
heterogeneous willingness to pay, when the total of the marginal cost and the monitoring cost is 
at a sufficiently low level, flat fee pricing dominates two-part tariff pricing and usage-based pricing. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is similar to the cases of Subsection 4.1. and Proposition 1. Flat fee 
pricing and two-part tariff pricing can both yield the same revenue, and usage-based pricing is strictly 
dominated in terms of revenue, but because there are positive (but small) marginal cost and 
monitoring cost to consider now, flat fee pricing can do better in terms of profit. While all three pricing 
schemes are affected by the positive marginal cost, flat fee pricing is free from the burden of positive 
monitoring cost, as there is essentially no need to monitor customers’ consumption for flat fee pricing. 
And for this reason, the optimal scheme becomes insensitive to these two costs when their sum is low. 
Holding monitoring cost constant, increasing marginal cost does not make flat fee pricing a worse 
choice than two-part tariff pricing or usage-based pricing, because it will have the same impact on all 
three pricing schemes. On the other hand, holding marginal cost constant, reducing monitoring cost 
does not make two-part tariff pricing or usage-based pricing better than flat fee pricing as long as the 
monitoring cost is still positive. This is because the monitoring cost will inevitably impact the revenue 
from two-part tariff pricing and usage-based pricing anyway. 
 
This result is interesting because it suggests that as the marginal cost is lowered with improving 
information technology (but not necessarily to zero), flat fee pricing becomes the optimal scheme, 
even though the monitoring cost may go down. A direct implication of this proposition is that flat fee 
pricing will become more attractive for information service providers. Also this result will be robust as 
long as the sum of the marginal cost and the monitoring cost is low. However, when the monitoring 
cost becomes negligible, two-part tariff pricing will become as attractive as flat fee pricing.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to help information service providers determine the most profitable 
pricing scheme to offer their customers and the optimal prices to charge them for subscription and 
usage. How information services should be priced has emerged as an important question as 
advances in information technology have continued to reduce marginal production and monitoring 
costs.  However, prior research has not resolved when the information service providers should adopt 
flat fee pricing and when they should adopt usage-based pricing with or without a subscription fee. 
 
We find that when both marginal cost and monitoring cost are negligible for a monopolist provider 
with homogeneous customers, pure usage-based pricing is strictly dominated by the flat fee and two-
part tariff pricing schemes, with the latter two always achieving the same profit level. The same result 
holds even when customers have heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay, which corresponds to 
different downward sloping demand curves. The intuition driving this result is that a monopolist 
information service provider with sufficient capacity can use flat fee pricing to extract the maximum 
consumer surplus possible. In the case of heterogeneous marginal willingness to pay, flat fee pricing 
extracts all the surplus of low-end consumers, leaving a surplus only for high-end customers if it is in 
the firm’s interest to serve both segments. The same is true for two-part tariff pricing, but pure usage 
based pricing is unable to extract all surplus from the low-end customers.  
 
These results explain why many monopoly information service providers charge flat fees for their 
services. For example, in many regions, there is just one cable TV provider enjoying monopoly power.  
Most, if not all, cable TV companies use flat monthly fees to extract consumer surplus.  Some pay-
per-view movie options are offered with two-part tariff pricing, as the customers must subscribe to 
some kind of cable TV plan before they can buy the on-demand movies. Gogo Inflight Internet also 
uses flat fee pricing based on the duration of a flight for its in-flight Internet connection services. As 
the customers essentially have no other Internet connection choice while they are in the air, Gogo 
Inflight Internet has successfully created a perfect monopoly environment, and its flat fee pricing 
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When customers are characterized by heterogeneous maximum consumption levels, two-part tariff 
pricing is more profitable than flat fee pricing due to the additional flexibility to address the 
consumption differences between the consumer groups. Both continue to dominate pure usage-
based pricing. This result is not true when the consumers are characterized simply by heterogeneous 
willingness to pay. It also extends the traditional nonlinear pricing literature on the optimality of two-
part tariff pricing to the case when the marginal cost is negligible. Cruise ship companies employ 
usage rates with or without a customer activation fee for onboard Internet access. Based on our 
analyses, we predict that these practices will evolve so that all cruise ship companies charge an 
activation fee: pure usage-based pricing will permit their customers to obtain the available consumer 
surplus. 
 
Our results on the optimality of flat fee pricing extends also to the case when we have positive 
marginal cost and monitoring cost, as long as the total of the marginal cost and the monitoring cost is 
below a threshold value. Flat fee pricing is preferred because it is free from customer consumption 
monitoring costs. MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter are all effectively monopolists in their 
differentiated market segments within the broad social networking space. These sites have decided to 
attract traffic by offering their services to the general public for free. They adopted the advertising-
supported business models early in the development of their business strategies. When they decide 
to charge their users for their services in the future once there are enough users with high termination 
or switching costs, we predict they will adopt flat pricing rather than usage-based pricing. As 
technology evolves to make the monitoring cost negligible, two-part tariff pricing may become more 
attractive. 
 
We do not present mathematical analyses for a competitive market structure in this paper, and so we 
prefer not to make claims that go beyond the insights generated by our modeling and analyses. We 
conjecture, however, that some companies will adopt pure usage-based pricing and leave some 
consumer surplus to the customers in order to attract more customers, depending on the nature of 
competition in the industry. From the customers’ point of view, pure usage-based pricing is attractive 
not only because it results in higher consumer surplus but also because it imposes less commitment 
or lock-in and more freedom to walk away whenever they want. This may explain why in many 
competitive industries, companies are adopting pure usage-based pricing, even though flat rate and 
two-part tariff pricing usually enable companies to extract more consumer surplus. For example, 
Google has employed flat rate pricing for its SaaS services. Google Apps is free for the Basic Edition, 
but the flat price is $50 per year per person for the Premier Edition. In contrast, Amazon has chosen 
to charge just a usage rate for its utility computing services (Simple Storage Service, S3, and Elastic 
Compute Cloud, EC2) to attract more customers concerned about lock-in. Similarly, E*Trade charges 
trade commissions based solely on the number of trades that its customers place.  
 
Our study suggests several directions for future research. Our analysis of three simple but popular 
pricing schemes is a first step toward understanding what are the most profitable pricing mechanisms 
for information services. To survive in a challenging business environment, information service 
providers must be more creative in designing their pricing strategies. For example, the service 
provider may wish to structure a pricing scheme that can redirect consumption from peak to non-peak 
hours when there are capacity constraints. A rigorous analysis of a duopoly or other competitive 
market structure may reveal strategic factors that influence market share and equilibrium pricing 
strategies. Yet another interesting direction to pursue is to study how providers can offer different 
quality levels and prices for their information services with a menu of options from which their 
customers can choose their preferred quality of services. Alternatively, future research may explore 
how providers could use a bundling strategy for different information services.  
Acknowledgment: 
The authors thank G. Anandalingam, Monique Guignard-Spielberg, Lorin M. Hitt, Thomas Y. Lee, 
Balaji Padmanabhan, Pei-yu Chen and the Senior Editor, Area Editor and reviewers of the Journal of 
the Association for Information Systems for very constructive comments on earlier draft of this paper. 
We would also like to thank anonymous reviewers for providing some intuitions for some of the 
analysis results and the directions for future research. 
 
 
Wu & Banker/Best Pricing Strategy 
356 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 11 Issue 6 pp. 339-366 June 2010 
References: 
Armstrong, M. (1996) “Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing,” Econometrica (64) 1, pp. 51–75. 
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (2001) “Competitive price discrimination,” Rand J. Econom. (32) 4, pp. 
579–605. 
Bakos, Y. and E. Brynjolfsson (1999) “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency,” 
Management Science (45) 12, pp. 1613-1630. 
Calem, P. S. and D. F. Spulber (1984) “Multiproduct Two-part Tariffs,” Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (2), 
pp. 339–357. 
Choi, S., O. Dale, and A. B. Whinston (1997) The Economics of Electronic Commerce. Macmillan 
Technical Publishing, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
Chuang, C. I. and M. A. Sirbu (1999) “Optimal Bundling Strategy for Digital Information Goods: 
Network Delivery of Articles and Subscriptions,” Information Economics and Policy (11) 2, pp. 147-
176. 
Curle, D. (1998) “There is no value if it’s not relevant,” Information Today (15) 8.   
Essegaier, S., S. Gupta, and Z. J. Zhang (2002) “Pricing Access Services,” Marketing Science (21) 2, 
pp. 139-159. 
Fishburn, P.C., A. M. Odlyzko, and R. C. Siders (1997) “Fixed fee versus unit pricing for information 
goods: competition, equilibria, and price wars,” Proceedings of the Conference on Internet Publishing 
and Beyond: Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property. Cambridge MA. 
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1993) Game Theory. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Hayes, B. (1987) “Competition and two-part tariffs,” J. Bus. (60) 1, pp. 41-54. 
Jain, D., E. Muller, and N. Vilcassim (1999) “Pricing patterns of Cellular Phones and Phonecalls: A 
Segment-Level Analysis,” Management Science (45) 2, pp. 131-41. 
Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984) “Monopoly with incomplete information”. RAND J. Econom. (15), pp. 
171–196. 
Masuda, Y. and S. Whang (2006) “On the Optimality of Fixed-up-to Tariff for Telecommunications 
Services,” Information Systems Research (17) 3, pp. 247-253. 
Metcalfe, R. (1997) “Pollinate lets you rent the software you need for just the right amount of time,” 
Infoworld (June 9). 
Oi, W. Y. (1971) “A Disneyland dilemma: Two-part tariffs for a Mickey mouse monopoly,” Quart. J. 
Econom. (85) 1, pp. 77-96. 
PCS Week (1997) “Market worries as PCS carriers experiment with pricing,” (8) 6. 
Pindyck, R and D. Rubinfeld (1998) Microeconomics. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey. 
Rochet, J. and L. A. Stole (2002) “Nonlinear pricing with random participation constraints,” Rev. 
Econom. Stud. (69) 1, pp. 277-311. 
Schmalensee, R. (1981) “Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements,” Bell J. Econom. (12) 2, pp. 
445–466. 
Stole, L. A. (1995) “Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly,” J. Econom. Management Strategy (4) 4, pp. 
529–562. 
Sundararajan, A. (2004) “Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods,” Management Science (50) 12, pp. 
1660-1673. 
Varian, H. R. (2000) “Buying, Sharing and Renting Information Goods,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics (48) 4, pp. 473-488. 
Wilson, R. (1993) Nonlinear Pricing. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Wu, S. (2007) “Optimal Infrastructure Design and Expansion of Broadband Wireless Access 
Networks,” European Journal of Operational Research (178) 1, pp. 322-329. 
Wu, S. and P. Chen (2008) “Versioning and Piracy Control for Digital Information Goods,” Operations 
Research (56) 1, pp. 157-172. 
Wu, S., L. Hitt, P. Chen, and G. Anandalingam (2008) “Customized Bundle Pricing for Information 







Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 11 Issue 6 pp. 339-366 June 2010 
 
Wu & Banker/Best Pricing Strategy 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
If the service provider uses the pure flat fee pricing by setting PX = 0, PY = 0, and P > 0: 
 
It is clear that given this pricing plan, the consumers will fully utilize the service by choosing the 
consumption level X = X  and Y =Y  with the maximum utility the consumers can get a log( X +1) + b 
log(Y +1). It is then obvious that the maximum flat fee the service provider can charge is a log( X +1) 
+ b log(Y +1), with maximum profit: 
i
∑ [a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1)]. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
If the service provider uses the pure usage-based pricing by setting PX > 0, PY > 0, and P = 0: 
 




















= −  






∑ (PX X* + PY Y*) = ,MaxX YP P  i∑
(a - PX  + b - PY)                                                      
 
It is clear that to maximize the function above, the supplier will have to minimize PX and PY. From the 
first order conditions, we know that as PX and PY decrease, X* and Y* will increase. However, since X 













, with maximum profit: 
i
∑ (a - 1
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Proof of Lemma 3: 
If the service provider uses the two-part tariff pricing by setting PX > 0, PY > 0, and P > 0: 
 




















= −  
Supplier’s Optimization Problem becomes: 
, ,
Max
X YP P P i
∑ (PX X* + PY Y* + P) = , ,MaxX YP P P i∑
(a - PX  + b - PY + P)                                                      
 
Likewise, it is clear that to maximize the function above, the supplier will have to minimize PX and PY. 
From the first order conditions, we know that as PX and PY decrease, X* and Y* will increase. 
Nevertheless, since X and Y are bounded, X* and Y* will eventually become X  and Y . In other 












. The maximum subscription fee P the 
supplier can charge is then the difference between the maximum utility the consumers can get, a log(
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). Therefore, the 
maximum profit achievable by the service provider is 
i
∑ [a log( X +1) + b log(Y +1)], the same as 
in the case when the service provider adopts the flat fee pricing mechanism. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
It is clear that given 0XP = , 0YP = , and 0P > , if a consumer chooses to join the program, she will 
fully utilize the service by choosing the consumption level 1X X= , 1Y Y=  or 2X X= , 2Y Y= . 
Given this, it is obvious that the service provider can charge each high-end consumer no more than 
( ) ( )1 1log 1 log 1a X b Y+ + + , and each low-end consumer no more than 
( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1a X b Y+ + + . It can be easily shown that if we assume 1 2m na am
+





< (these correspond to our assumption that it is more profitable for the firm to serve both 
segments), the service provider will charge ( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1a X b Y+ + +  and serve both high-end 
and low-end consumers with the maximum profit achievable 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2log 1 log 1m n a X b Y + + + +  . 
 
Proof of Lemma 5:  
When 0XP > , 0YP > , and 0P = , the first-order conditions for optimality of high-end/low-end 





* 1 X X
a aP X
X P
= ⇒ = −
+





* 1 Y Y
b bP Y
Y P
= ⇒ = −
+





* 1 X X
a aP X
X P
= ⇒ = −
+





* 1 Y Y
b bP Y
Y P
= ⇒ = −
+
                                (23) 
The Supplier’s Optimization Problem becomes: 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2, ,
Max ( * *) ( * *) Max ( ) ( )
X Y X Y
X Y X Y X Y X YP P P P
m P X P Y n P X P Y m a P b P n a P b P+ + + = − + − + − + −                                            
 
To maximize the function above, the supplier will have to minimize XP  and YP . From (20) - (23), we 
know that as XP  and YP  decrease, 1 *X , 2 *X , 1 *Y and 2 *Y  will increase. But since 1X , 2X , 1Y
and 2Y  are bounded (constraints (15) and (16)), 1 *X , 2 *X , 1 *Y and 2 *Y  cannot exceed X  and 
Y  respectively, and this suggests that as price goes down further, no increase in demand can be 
expected. To derive the optimal prices, we consider the peak hour problem first. The peak hour 
demand curves of the high-end and low-end consumers (constraints (20) and (22)) are shown in 
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Figure 4:  The Peak Hour Demand Curves of the High-end and Low-end Consumers 
 
The supplier’s optimization problem is:  
1 2 1 2Max ( *) ( *) Max ( ) ( )
X X
X X X XP P
m P X n P X m a P n a P+ = − + − . 
 
To maximize this function, the supplier will have to minimize XP  and therefore the best price XP  








, the profit 
is not optimal since 1 *X and 2 *X  cannot exceed X  and user demand will not increase as the 










the price is in this interval, the demand of the high-end consumer is fixed at X  while the demand of 
the low-end consumer keeps on increasing as the price goes down. Thus, we have: 
1 2 2 2Max ( *) ( *) Max ( ) ( ) Max ( )
X X X
X X X X XP P P
m P X n P X m P X n a P n a mX n P+ = + − = + − .  
 



























Proof of Lemma 6: 
When 0XP > , 0YP > , and 0P > , the first-order conditions for the high-end/low-end consumer’s 
optimization problem yield Equations (20)-(23).  
 
Likewise, we use the divide-and-conquer technique to do the analysis. As before, we consider only 
the peak hour problem here. The joint problem with non-peak hours can be solved in a similar way. 
Equations (20) and (22) are the peak hour demand curves of the high-end and low-end consumers (
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Figure 5:  The Best Subscription Fee is Equal to the Consumer Surplus of the Low-
end Consumers 
 
First, we make the following observation: no matter what unit usage price XP  the supplier sets for the 
service, the best subscription fee P  it can charge the consumers is the consumer surplus of the low-
end consumers (the triangle area under 2D  and above XP ).
6
 
 Any subscription fee more than this will 
let the supplier lose all of the low-end consumers. 







supplier’s optimization problem will be: 
2 1
2




Max ( *) ( *) ( ) Max ( ) ( ) ( ) d
1






X X X X XP P P
P
X
am P X n P X m n P m a P n a P m n P X
X
am a a m n a
P
−  
+ + + = − + − + + − + 
= − + +
∫
 
To maximize this function the supplier will have to minimize XP  and therefore the best price XP  in 




 with the maximum profit achievable 21 2 2
1
( ) ( ) log ( 1)am a a m n a X
a
− + + + .  
 






, the supplier’s optimization 
problem will be:  
2 1
2




Max ( *) ( *) ( ) Max ( ) ( ) ( ) d
1






X X X X XP P P
XP
X
am P X n P X m n P m P X n a P m n P X
X
am X P ma m n a
P
−  
+ + + = + − + + − + 
= + − + +
∫
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 with the maximum profit achievable 
2( ) log( 1)m n a X+ + . Note that this profit is larger than 21 2 2
1
( ) ( ) log ( 1)am a a m n a X
a
− + + +  (the 












, the supplier’s optimization problem 





Max ( *) ( *) ( ) Max ( ) ( ) ( ) d
1




X X X X XP P P
P
am P X n P X m n P m P X n P X m n P X
X
m n a X
 










with the maximum profit achievable 2( ) log( 1)m n a X+ + . 
 










, and subscription fee P  equal to the 
consumer surplus of the low-end consumers, with the maximum profit achievable 
2 2( )[ log( 1) log( 1)]m n a X b Y+ + + + . However, since many consumers see the subscription fee 
as some kind of entry barrier, the supplier may prefer to lower this entry barrier so that it can attract 








Y +  
respectively, and minimize the subscription fee 𝑃 = 𝑎2log�𝑋 + 1� +





, still with the maximum profit achievable: 
2 2( )[ log( 1) log( 1)]m n a X b Y+ + + + .
7
 
                   
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Assume customer i has type: ia  and ib , which follow the uniform distribution between 0 and 1, that is 
i, ia  and ib  are all normalized to be between 0 and 1, ~ U(0,1). Note that with this assumption, we 
implicitly assume 𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖 since they are all between 0 and 1 now.  
 
If the service provider uses the flat fee pricing: 
Given 0XP = , 0YP = , and 0P > , charged by the firm, we can determine the marginal customer, M,  
who will sign up by 𝑎𝑀 log(𝑋� + 1) + 𝑏𝑀 log(𝑌� + 1) = 𝑃 , with profit for the firm (1 −𝑀)𝑃 . To 
maximize the profit, the firm will set 𝑃 = 1
2
[log(𝑋� + 1) + log(𝑌� + 1)], with 𝑀 = 1
2
, i.e. customers with 
                                                     
7 The same argument holds for the case when all consumers are homogeneous and the firm adopts the two-part tariff 
pricing as in Lemma 3. 
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type higher than 
1
2
will join the service. The maximum profit under this scheme is thus  1
4
[log(𝑋� +
1) + log(𝑌� + 1)]. 
 
If the service provider uses the pure usage-based pricing: 
As before, the demand function is characterized by 𝑋𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑃𝑥




have 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋� ; and when 𝑃𝑋 <
𝑎𝑖
𝑋�+1
, we have 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋� . In addition, given this demand function, a 
customer with type higher than 𝑃𝑋(𝑋� + 1) will consume 𝑋�. Similarly, we also have 𝑌𝑖 =
𝑏𝑖
𝑃𝑌
− 1 ≤ 𝑌�, 
that is, when 𝑃𝑌 ≥
𝑏𝑖
𝑌�+1
, we have 𝑌𝑖 ≤ 𝑌�; and when 𝑃𝑌 <
𝑏𝑖
𝑌�+1
, we have 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌�. In addition, given this 
demand function, a customer with type higher than 𝑃𝑌(𝑌� + 1) will consume 𝑌�.   
 
The firm will choose 𝑃𝑋 and 𝑃𝑌 that maximize its profit: ∫ 𝑋𝑖𝑃𝑋
𝑃𝑋(𝑋�+1)
0 𝑑𝑎 + [1 − 𝑃𝑋(𝑋� + 1)]𝑋�𝑃𝑋 +
∫ 𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑌
𝑃𝑌(𝑌�+1)
0 𝑑𝑏 + [1 − 𝑃𝑌(𝑌� + 1)]𝑌�𝑃𝑌 . Plugging in 𝑋𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑃𝑥
− 1 ≤ 𝑋�  and 𝑌𝑖 =
𝑏𝑖
𝑃𝑌
− 1 ≤ 𝑌� , and 



















�, which is smaller than 1
4
[log(𝑋� + 1) + log(𝑌� + 1)], 
the profit of the flat fee pricing, as 1
4
















 for all 𝑋�, 𝑌� > 
0. 
 
If the service provider uses the two-part tariff pricing: 
The firm will choose 𝑃𝑋 , 𝑃𝑌  and P to maximize its profit. Note that given any 𝑃𝑋 , 𝑃𝑌  and P , the 
marginal customer, M, who will sign up the service is determined by 𝑎𝑀 log(𝑋𝑀 + 1) + 𝑏𝑀 log(𝑌𝑀 +
1) − 𝑋𝑀𝑃𝑋 − 𝑌𝑀𝑃𝑌 − 𝑃 = 0  and the profit of the service provider is ∫ 𝑋𝑖𝑃𝑋
𝑃𝑋(𝑋�+1)
𝑀 𝑑𝑎 +
[1 − 𝑃𝑋(𝑋� + 1)]𝑋�𝑃𝑋 + ∫ 𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑌
𝑃𝑌(𝑌�+1)
𝑀 𝑑𝑏 + [1 − 𝑃𝑌(𝑌� + 1)]𝑌�𝑃𝑌 + (1 −𝑀)𝑃. To maximize the profit, 
we can plug in 𝑋𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑃𝑥
− 1 ≤ 𝑋� , 𝑌𝑖 =
𝑏𝑖
𝑃𝑌
− 1 ≤ 𝑌� , 𝑃 = 𝑎𝑀 log(𝑋𝑀 + 1) + 𝑏𝑀 log(𝑌𝑀 + 1) −










 and 𝑃 = 1
2






� , with 𝑀 = 1
2
 and the maximum profit: 
1
4
[log(𝑋� + 1) + log(𝑌� + 1)], which is the same as what can be achieved in the flat fee pricing 
scheme. 
 
Proof of Lemma 7: 
If the service provider uses the pure flat rate pricing by setting PX = 0, PY = 0, and P > 0: 
 
It is clear that given this pricing plan, if a consumer (either high-demand consumer or low-demand 
consumer) chooses to join the program, she will fully utilize the service by choosing the consumption 
level X1 = 1X , Y1 = 1Y or X2 = 2X , Y2 = 2Y  with the maximum utility receivable a log( 1X +1) + b log( 1Y
+1) or a log( 2X +1) + b log( 2Y +1) (for high-demand and low-demand consumer respectively). Then 
it is obvious that the service provider can charge each high-demand consumer no more than a log(
1X +1) + b log( 1Y +1) and each low-demand consumer no more than a log( 2X +1) + b log( 2Y +1) as 
the flat rate for the service. Since we assume the service provider could not distinguish high-demand 
and low-demand consumers and must charge them the same price, the service provider can either 
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b log( 2Y +1) and serve both high-demand and low-demand consumers. If we further assume that m 
[a log( 1X +1) + b log( 1Y +1)] < (m + n) [a log( 2X +1) + b log( 2Y +1)], the best the service provider 
can do is charge a log( 2X +1) + b log( 2Y +1)  and serve both high-demand and low-demand 
consumers with the maximum profit achievable (m + n) [a log( 2X +1) + b log( 2Y +1)]. 
 
Proof of Lemma 8: 
If the service provider uses the pure usage-based pricing by setting PX > 0, PY > 0, and P = 0: 
 













































= −                              (27) 
The Supplier’s Optimization Problem will become: 
Max m (PX X1* + PY Y1*) + n (PX X2* + PY Y2*)  
= Max m (a1 - PX  + b1 - PY) + n (a2 - PX  + b2 - PY)                                                     
 
It is clear that to maximize the equation above, the supplier will have to minimize PX and PY. From 
Equations (24), (25), (26) and (27), we know that as PX and PY decrease, X1*, X2*, Y1*and Y2* will 
increase. But since X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 are bounded at 1X , 2X , 1Y  and 2Y  respectively, the best PX 






























), when 𝑛𝑋2 ≥ 𝑚 and 𝑛𝑌2 ≥ 𝑚. 
 
To see why this is true, let’s consider only the peak-hour problem first. Equations (24) and (26) are 
actually the peak-hour demand curves of the high-demand and low-demand consumers. Note that X1*, 
X2* are bounded at 1X  and 2X . Now the supplier’s optimization problem will be Max m (PX X1*) + n 
(PX X2*) = Max m (a1 - PX) + n (a2 - PX). It is clear that to maximize this equation, the supplier will have 




. On the other hand, if 




, the profit is not optimal since X1*and X2* cannot exceed 1X  









. When the price is in this interval, the demand of the low-
demand consumer is fixed at 2X  while the demand of the high-demand consumer keeps on 
increasing as the price goes down. Now the supplier’s optimization problem will be Max m (PX X1*) + 
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n (PX X2*) = Max m (a - PX) + n (PX 2X ) = Max ma + (n 2X -m)PX. When 𝑛𝑋2 ≥ 𝑚, the best price PX 




. Similar analysis can be done on the non-peak-hour problem and 







 when 𝑛𝑌2 ≥ 𝑚.  
 
Therefore, if the service provider uses the pure usage-based pricing, when 𝑛𝑋2 ≥ 𝑚, the optimal 
price in the peak hours is 𝑃𝑋 =
𝑎
𝑋2+1








� ; otherwise, the optimal prices are given by 𝑃𝑋 =
𝑎
𝑋1+1
 and 𝑃𝑌 =
𝑏
𝑌1+1










Proof of Lemma 9: 
If the service provider uses the two-part tariff pricing by setting PX > 0, PY > 0, and P > 0: 
 













































= −                              (31) 
 
Likewise, we use divide-and-conquer technique to do the analysis. Again, we consider only the peak-
hour problem first and the joint problem with non-peak-hour consideration can be solved in a similar 
way. Equations (28) and (30) are the peak-hour demand curves of the high-demand and low-demand 
consumers. Note that X1*, X2* are bounded at 1X  and 2X . First, we make the following observation: 
no matter what unit usage price PX the supplier set for the service, the best subscription fee P it can 
charge the consumers is the consumer surplus of the low-demand consumers. Any subscription fee 
more than this is going to let the supplier lose all of the low-demand consumers. If the numbers of 
high-demand and low-demand consumers do not differ a lot, unless the supplier can earn a lot from 
the high-demand consumers alone, it is not wise for the supplier to lose all of the low-demand 
consumers. 
 
Now, let’s decide what the best unit usage price the supplier should charge is. First, if the supplier 




, the supplier’s optimization problem will be Max m (PX X1*) 
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with the maximum profit achievable (m + n) a log 
( 2X +1).  
 








, the supplier’s 
optimization problem will be Max m (PX X1*) + n (PX X2*) + (m + n) P = Max m (a - PX) + n (PX 2X ) + 












∫ =Max ma - m( 2X +1)PX + (m + n) a log( 2X +1). Since  m( 2X +1) > 











 + (m + n) a log ( 2X +1). 
 




, the supplier’s optimization problem 












∫ = Max m ( )1 2X X− PX + (m + n) a log( 2X +1). It is clear that to maximize 











 + (m + n) a log ( 2X +1). 
 
Now, we are ready to sum up the case when the service provider uses two-part tariff pricing by setting 
PX > 0, PY > 0, and P > 0. Based on an analysis similar to the above on the joint problem inclusive of 









subscription fee P equal to the consumer surplus of the low-demand consumers, with the maximum 
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